Center for Defense Information
Possille Consequences for What if Space Were Weaponized?
Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios
By Jeffrey Lewis
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
Washington,D.C.
July 2004..About the Author
Jeffrey Lewis will be a postdoctoral fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program,funded by the John D.and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation,at the Center for Inter-national and Security Studies at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy (CISSM).
He previously worked for an Internet start-up and in the Of .ce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
He has authored articles in the Georgetown Journal of Inter national Affairs ,National Security Studies Quarterly,Harvard Asia Quarterly ,and the Washington Quarterly.Jeffrey graduated magna cum laude from Augustana College in Rock Island,Ill.,with degrees in Philosophy and Political Science.
The author would like to thank CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson, for her contribution to this monograph.
About the Center for Defense Information
The Centre for Defence Information is dedicated to strengthening security through: international cooperation; reduced reliance on unilateral military power to resolve con .ict; reduced reliance on nuclear weapons ;a transformed and reformed military establishment; and, prudent oversight of, and spending on, defence programs.
CDI seeks to contribute alternative views on security to promote wide-ranging discourse and debate. CDI educates the public and informs policy-makers about issues of security policy, strategy , operations, weapon systems and defences budgeting, and pursues creative solutions to the problems of today and tomorrow.
CDI aims to improve understanding between the United States and key nations on security mat- ters through new global media initiatives that inform and educate opinion makers, policymakers, and people around the world. How We Do Our Job. To ensure the ability to provide objective analysis, CDI accepts no government or defence industry funding.
To encourage the intellectual freedom of the staff, CDI does not hold organizational positions.
Instead,staff members are dedicated to the concept that the public and political leaders can, and will,make wise choices on complex security matters when provided with facts, and practical alternatives.
CDI ’s Space Security project is made possible by a generous grant from
Carnegie Corporation of New York..
Board of Advisors
Dr.Bruce G.Blair -President,CDI
Doris Z.Bato – Santa Fe,N.M.
Barbara Berger – Aspen,Colo.
Bruce Berger – Aspen,Colo.
Arthur D.Berliss,Jr.– Captain,U.S.Naval
Reserve (Ret.);for mer Vice President,Allen-
Hollander,Co.,New York,N.Y.
Edward H.R.Blitzer – For mer Chair man,
Lightolier Inc.,New York,N.Y.
Dick Brukenfeld – Dobbs Ferry,N.Y.
Pauline &Ronald Cantwell – Old
Greenwich,Ct.
Ben Cohen – Founder,Ben &Jerry ’s Homemade,
Inc.,South Burlington,Vt.
James R.Compton – Chair Emeritus,Fund
for Peace Board,and Compton Foundation,Los
Gatos,Calif.
Joseph N.Deblinger – President,Deblinger
Sales &Marketing Corp.,Manhasset,N.Y.
Gay Dillingham – CNS Communications,
Santa Fe,N.M.
Raymond Frankel – Los Angeles,Calif.
John &Jessica Fullerton – Aspen,Colo.
Seth M.Glickenhaus – Investment Banker,
New York,N.Y.
Eva Haller – Santa Barbara,Calif.
Yoel Haller,M.D.– Santa Barbara,Calif.
James D.Head,Ph.D.– President,Strategy
Deve l opme nt Company,Fr e e l and,Mi ch.;
Chairman of the Board,CDI
David H.Horowitz – New York,N.Y.
Robert G.James – Rear Admiral,U.S.Naval
Reserve (Ret.);President,Enterprise Development
Associates,New York,N.Y.
Alan F.Kay,Ph.D.– Businessman,St.Augustine,
Fla.
Euge ne M.Lang – Fo unde r /Cha i r ma n
Emeritus,REFAC Technology Development
Corp.,and Project Pericles,New York,N.Y.
Gene R.La Rocque – Rear Admiral,U.S.Navy
(Ret.);President Emeritus,CDI,Washington,
D.C.
Ellie Meyers – Deer .eld,Ill.
Robert M.Meyers,M.D.– Deer .eld,Ill.
David E.Moore – Rye,N.Y.
Paul Newman – Motion Pictures,Los Angeles,
Calif.Mr.
&Mrs.Joseph Pulitzer,IV – St.Louis,Mo.
John M.Rockwood – Publisher,Chicago,Ill.
Julie Schecter,Ph.D.– Director,Peaked Hill
Trust,Wayland,Mass.
Gloria Scher – New York,N.Y.
John J.Shanahan – Vice Admiral,U.S.Navy
(Ret.),Ormond Beach,Fla.
Adele E.Starr – Mamaroneck,N.Y.
Ph i l i p A.S t r a u s,J r.– P h o t o g r a p h e r,
Philadelphia,Pa.
Andrew Ungerleider – Earthstone International
Ltd.,Santa Fe,N.M.
Barbara Slaner Winslow,Ph.D.– School
of Education and Women ’s Studies Program,
Brooklyn College/City University of New York,
N.Y.
Joanne Woodward – Actress-Director,Westport,
Conn...
Table of Contents
Forward
Executive Summary
U.S.Vulnerability to Foreign ASATs
ASATS,Ours and Theirs,on the Korean Peninsula (2010)
Preemption Scenario
Crisis Instability Over the Taiwan Strait (2010)
Alert Rate Scenarios
Russia and China in 2010
Accidental Nuclear War Scenario
Crisis Over Kalningrad (2010)
Third Party Escalation Scenario
India/Pakistan (2010)
Endnotes Acronyms
9
11 13
17 21 25 29
33 36..
Under t he admi ni s t rat i on of President George W.Bush,there has been increasing
emphasis by U.S.government of ofcials on the perceived need for the United States to pre-
pare for eventual war in space.Long-range U.S. Space Command and Missile Defense Agency
plans already envision the deployment of space-based weapons (designed to attack satellites,bal-
listic missiles and/or terrestrial targets)as integral parts of future U.S.arsenals.1
The following analysis is an attempt to postulate the possible implications of space weaponiza-
tion for future real-world crises.There are myriad factors to be accounted for in any such analysis,
and just as many potential outcomes to any crisis war-gaming.Indeed,it is somewhat dif .cult to
tease out the direct affect of space weapons in any single crisis situation vs.other factors,such as the
overarching political relationships of the day or the dynamics of nuclear deterrence.
Obviously,not all analysts would come to the same conclusions in reviewing any one of the
scenarios postulated here.For example,there is a signi .cant school of thought within the U.S.
military that,in many circumstances,space weapons capabilities might serve as crisis stabiliz-
ing mechanisms,in that such capabilities could provide options less dramatic than other methods
of force application.Others are skeptical about the role for arms control.Former Pentagon coun-
terproliferation chief Ashton Carter has argued that not all space missions deserve protection from
anti-satellite (ASATs) weapons and,moreover, hat prohibitions on ASATs might encourage the
development of space-based strike weapons.2
However,the intent of this study is to highlight situations where the use,or threatened use,of
space weapons might work to exacerbate tensions or even catalyze war.There are strong reasons
to consider these possibilities:even the U.S.Air Force ’s own space war games up to now have
concluded that potential negative consequences from the use of space weapons –including the
possibility of triggering a nuclear response from an enemy – cannot be dismissed..
Suffce to say that the key problem today is that not nearly enough public policy effort has
yet been made to think through the potential risks and/or bene .ts to international peace from any
U.S. moves to weaponize space .CDI ’s Space Security program, made possible by the generous
support of Carnegie Corporation of New York, is aimed at educating the public and policymakers
on this important issue. In line with that mission, this monograph is designed to provoke concrete
debate on how space weapons might impact future national and global security.
Theresa Hitchens
Vice President and Directo, Space Security Project
Center for Defence Information
Forward..
“Our preoccupation with military power as a
political tool needs to be faced and overcome.”
— Paul C. Warnke
This is a monograph about space weaponization,
but its arguments are part of a much larger debate about
the limits and prospects of military power as a political tool.
The inauguration of the George W.Bush administration occasioned a subtle rhetorical
shift in how the president of the United States describes the fact that United States
and Russia each maintain thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the other
–the term “mutual deterrence ”has been replaced with the less com-forting “mutual
vulnerability.”3 Nothing good ,of course ,can be said of vulnerability.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took the rhetorical shift further,equating
vulnerability with weak-ness:“Weakness is provocative,”Rumsfeld told the Senate
Armed Services Committee,“Weak-ness invites people into doing things they wouldn’t
otherwise think of.”4
But for much of the Cold War,vulnerability was an inescapable fact of life.The Soviet Union
and the United States were,roughly speaking, committed to denying the other invulnerability,
which might be used for coercion.In that light, the futility of .nding a technological end-run
around the arms race was a powerful force for détente and accommodation.
The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review suggests that the development of space-
based and space-enabled systems –global strike,missile defense and enhanced command,
control and intelligence capabilities –will revolutionize deterrence.The real problem is that the
suite of space capabilities outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review creates the illusion that
vulnerability is a policy choice,rather than a fact of life.
The U.S.denigration of mutual deterrence has caused consternation in China and Russia,which
express concern that American rhetoric about moving beyond the Cold War belies an interest
in acquiring the capability for highly intrusive,preemptive actions.Beijing and Moscow have
pressed for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the issue of “pre-
venting an arms race in outer space.”The U.S. position has been that there is no space arms
race currently underway and that negotiations are unnecessary.
The prospect that space weapons might ren-der the United States invulnerable to any kind
of attack will remain tempting.And,for the foreseeable future,it will remain out of reach,
for myriad reasons.
Many warn that space weapons will be tech-nologically daunting and cost-prohibitive,while
alienating nations allied to the United States andantagonizing others.These .ve scenarios
attempt to explain a different,complicated idea:In a
Executive Summary.12 What if Space Were Weaponized?
world with space weapons,the United States may be better armed,but we may well be less secure.
•Scenario 1 argues that U.S.anti-satellite (ASAT)programs are likely to inspire and
aid the ASAT programs of others.In a world where many states have ASATs,
the United States,which is heavily de-pendent on space systems,has the most
to lose.
•Scenario 2 argues that the tremendous value provided by space-based military
systems is also very vulnerable to attack,creating perverse incentives for a U.S.
president to rapidly escalate con .ict in a crisis situation.
•Scenario 3 argues that Russia and China are likely to change their nuclear postures
in response to expanding U.S.military capabilities in outer space,increasing the
readiness of their forces at the expense of operational control,and undermining
years of efforts at risk reduction.
•Scenario 4 argues that the space-enabled war-.ghting strategies tangle nuclear and
space forces together in a way that creates unnecessary risks of accident –such as a
piece of space debris striking a Russian early-war ning satellite that could be
interpreted as an attack.
•Scenario 5 considers the possibility of conficts that escalate into space,threat-
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